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NOTES
COMPENSATION UNDER THE WARSAW
CONVENTION FOR VICTIMS OF HIJACKINGS
AND TERRORIST ATTACKS
INTRODUCTION
The Warsaw Convention' has generated enormous interest
and controversy since its inception. Most criticism has focused
upon the inequity of the Convention's ceiling on recoveries for
passenger injury and death in international aviation while no
limitation of liability usually exists for domestic aviation. 2 In-
deed, a large portion of Convention litigation has involved at-
tempts to avoid the Convention's liability limits, either by em-
ploying one of the methods provided by the Convention or by
demonstrating the inapplicability of the Convention.
Hijacking and terrorist activities have provided the bases of
most recent Convention litigation and have led to attempts by
injured plaintiffs to be absorbed into the Convention rather than
to remain outside it and subject totally to local law. This note
examines the Warsaw Convention itself and its modifying agree-
ments in order to analyze the reasons for this change and the
effect of the attempted expansion of the Convention to accom-
modate these activities. The meaning of key terms employed by
the Convention and their interpretation by the courts of various
States will be discussed.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE WARSAW SYSTEM
The Warsaw Convention is an international aviation agree-
ment which is the product of conferences in Paris in 1925 and
1. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by Air, done Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000 (1935-36), T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S.
11 [hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention]. French is the only official language of the
Convention. Warsaw Convention, art. 36.
2. See, e.g., Report on the Warsaw Convention as Amended by the Hague Protocol,
26 J. AIR L. & CoM. 255, 265-67 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Convention Report]; The
National Association of Claimants Counsel of America Bar Association Memorandum on
the Warsaw Convention, the Hague Protocol and the IGIA Recommendations 12-14
(1963).
3. Warsaw Convention, arts. 20 & 21.
4. The agreement was signed in Warsaw by the original parties and later adhered to
with reservation by the United States. Declaration of Adherence deposited at Warsaw,
Poland, July 31, 1934, 49 Stat. 3000 (1935-36), T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11.
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Warsaw in 1929.: The purposes of the Convention were to aid the
infant international airline industry by establishing uniform rules
governing international air carriage and to limit carriers' liability
for potentially ruinous losses, thereby enabling them to obtain
insurance and financial support.' The limit established under the
Convention was 125,000 Poincare francs7 (approximately U.S.
$8,300). In return for the establishment of a limit, the carriers
accepted a presumption of liability in suits brought under the
Convention?
In 1955, a diplomatic conference was convened at The Hague
to amend the Convention. The resulting Hague Protocol'" in-
creased the liability limit to 250,000 francs" (U.S. $16,6002) -
double the previous limit. The Protocol became effective on Au-
gust 1, 1963. Although the United States had attended the Hague
5. The Comit6 International Tdchnique d'Experts Juridique A6riens, a drafting
committee established at the Paris Conference, developed the draft presented to the
delegates at the Warsaw Conference. See Comrrt INTERNATIONAL TECHNIQUE D'EXPERTS
JURIDIQUE AtRIENS, COMTE-RENDU (1926-30) [hereinafter cited as C.I.T.E.J.A. MINUTEs].
6. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80
HA'v. L. REV. 497, 498-99 (1967).
7. Warsaw Convention, art. 22.
8. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 499. This conversion figure has been
the one most generally used by courts and commentators. However, the precise figure
based upon the conversion rate for gold prior to 1971 is U.S. $8,292.
Under an amendment to the Warsaw Convention proposed in a conference in Mon-
treal in 1975, the limit of liability would be changed to 8,300 Special Drawing Rights as
defined by the International Monetary Fund. The conversion into national currencies is
to be "made according to the value of such currencies atthe date of judgment." Additional
Protocol No. 1 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, done Sept. 25, 1975,
I.C.A.O. Doc. 9154-LC/174-2, art. II at 261 (1975). This proposed amendment is not yet
in effect; the traditional dollar approximations will be used throughout this note, without
allowance for recent fluctuations in the price of gold.
9. Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention states the limits of carrier liability as to
passenger injury and death. Article 20 relieves the carrier of this liability upon proof that
"he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damages or that it was
impossible for him or them to take such measures." Article 21 provides the carrier with
the defense of contributory negligence.
10. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, done Sept, 28,
1955, I.C.A.O. Doc. 7686-LC/140, art. XI, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter cited as Hague
Protocol].
11. Hague Protocol, art. XI.
12. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 507. The franc-based liability limit
would be replaced with 16,600 Special Drawing Rights under a proposed amendment to
the Hague Protocol. Additional Protocol No. 2 to Amend the Convention for the Unifica-
tion of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12
October 1929 as Amended by the Protocol Done at the Hague on 28 September 1955, done
Sept. 25, 1975, I.C.A.O. Doc. 9154-LC/174-2, art. II at 265 (1975). See note 8 supra.
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conference and played an important role in the negotiations, it
refused to ratify the agreement because of dissatisfaction with
what was considered an inadequate liability limit.'"
On November 15, 1965, the United States filed a formal no-
tice of denunciation of the Convention." A conference was subse-
quently held in Montreal to attempt to reach an agreement which
would satisfy the United States' demand for a higher limit.' Al-
though the meeting itself failed to produce an agreement, the
International Air Transport Association intervened and arranged
an interim agreement."6 The major international carriers would
accept a $75,000 limit as well as a waiver of their defense of due
care, thus introducing the concept of absolute liability.1 7
A 1971 conference in Guatemala City attempted to further
amend the Convention. The Guatemala Protocol" incorporated
the basic United States demand of 1966 by raising the limit to
1,500,000 francs" (U.S. $100,0000) and eliminating the carriers'
13. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 532-46.
14. The denunciation was to be effective six months later unless there was a "reason-
able prospect" for the establishment of a $100,000 limit of liability, with a provisional
agreement in effect by that date with a $75,000 limit. 53 DEP'T STATE BULL. 923 (1965).
15. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 551. For a statement of the United
States position, see Lowenfeld, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 54 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 580 (1966).
16. 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966); 49 U.S.C. § 1502, 'n.1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Montreal Agreement]. The Montreal Agreement would affect only passengers whose tick-
ets indicate the United States as a point of embarkation, destination, or transit. Unlike
other parts of the Warsaw system, the Montreal Agreement is a contractual arrangement
between the United States and individual international air carriers, rather than a treaty
negotiated by sovereign States. See Lacey, Recent Developments in the Warsaw
Convention, 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 385 (1967).
17. 1 L. KREINDLER, AvIATION AcCIDENT LAW § 12A.01 (1971).
18. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to International Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, done Mar. 8, 1971,
I.C.A.O. Doc. 9040-LC/167-2 at 183 [hereinafter cited as Guatemala Protocol].
19. Guatemala Protocol, art. VIII. Provision was also made for individual nations to
sponsor a plan of supplemental compensation. Guatemala Protocol, art. X1V.
20. A. LOWENFELD, AvITION LAW § 6.2, at VI-142 (1972). Provision was made for
automatic increases after the fifth and tenth years following the effective date of the treaty
unless such increase was vetoed by a two-thirds vote. Guatemala Protocol, art. XV. Each
increase would be approximately $12,500. Id. at VI-142, n.f. Thus after ten years in effect,
the liability limit would be raised to approximately $125,000.
According to a proposed amendment to the Guatemala Protocol, 100,000 Special
Drawing Rights would replace the current franc-based liability limit. Additional Protocol
No. 3 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Interna-
tional Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929 as Amended by the Protocols
Done at the Hague on 28 September 1955 and at Guatemala City on 8 March 1971, done
Sept. 25, 1975, I.C.A.O. Doc. 9154-LC/174-2, art. II at 269 (1975). See note 8 supra.
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defense of due care.21 The Protocol was signed by the delegates,
but has not yet become effective.22
The passenger's route, as stated on his ticket, determines
which international agreement governs his action for injury or
death - the Convention, the Hague Protocol, or the Montreal
Agreement. The Convention applies only if the contract of car-
riage (i.e., the ticket) encompasses "international transporta-
tion," which is defined as including: any carriage in which Con-
vention countries are the places of departure and destination re-
gardless of the status of any intermediate stops; and any carriage
in which a single Convention country is the point of departure
and destination, if there is an intermediate stop in a foreign coun-
try.23 A similar scheme determines the applicability of the Hague
Protocol 4 and the Guatemala Protocol.25 The Montreal Agree-
ment, however, applies whenever the United States is the point
of departure or destination, or a specified intermediate stop, as
listed on the ticket.2 6
An example will demonstrate the peculiar and often inequi-
table results reached through the present system. An XYZ Air-
lines flight is scheduled to depart from County #1 (a Convention
party), making intermediate stops in Country #2 (a signatory of
the Convention as modified by the Hague Protocol) and Country
#3 (not a member of the Warsaw system), and arrive in the
United States (a party to the Montreal Agreement). The flight is
hijacked after leaving Country #2, resulting in passenger injury
claims.
Passenger A's ticket states that his passage is from Country
#1 to Country #3. A is not subject to the Convention liability
limits since the place of destination is a non-Convention party.
21. Guatemala Protocol, art. IX. Under Article 20, paragraph 1 of the Warsaw Con-
vention, a carrier is relieved of all liability "if he proves that he and his agents have taken
all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for him or them to
take such measures." Article VI of the Guatemala Protocol retains this language but
rather than applying to all liability, relief is limited to damage resulting from delays. In
an action for personal injuries or death, the only defense the carrier retains in the Guate-
mala Protocol is that of contributory negligence. Guatemala Protocol, art. VIII.
22. The Protocol requires ratification by thirty States, with a further requirement
that five of those States must account for 40% of the total scheduled international air
traffic in 1970 by members of the International Civil Aviation Organization. Guatemala
Protocol, art. XX.
23. Warsaw Convention, art. 1.
24. Hague Protocol, art. XVIII.
25. Guatemala Protocol, art. XVI.
26. Montreal Agreement, supra note 16.
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Passenger B holds a round-trip ticket between Country #2 and
Country #3; B is covered by the Hague Protocol although both
departure and arrival are within the same country, since a foreign
country is an intermediate stop and Country #2 is a Hague Proto-
col signatory. B's limit of liability thus would be approximately
$16,600. Passenger C's ticket provides passage from Country #1
to Country #2; C is thus covered by the Convention limit of ap:
proximately $8,300 since both are Warsaw signatories, although
Country #2 also signed the Hague Protocol. Passenger D holds a
round-trip ticket from Country #1 to the United States. Here the
Montreal Agreement limitation of $75,000 would control since the
United States is an intermediate stop. A fifth result would be
possible if the Guatemala Protocol, with its approximately
$100,000 liability limit, becomes effective."
Under this patchwork system, passengers injured on the
same aircraft may be entitled to differing recoveries: unlimited
liability if the passenger's trip is not covered by the Warsaw
system; an $8,300 limit under the Convention; a $16,600 limit
under the Hague Protocol; and a $75,000 limit under the Mon-
treal Agreement.
While the manner in which the ticket is written controls the
application of the Warsaw system, the particular factual circum-
stances determine whether a party to an action would desire to
avoid Convention coverage. Relevant factors include the gravity
of the injury, the place of occurrence, and the possible negligence
of the carrier.
In the recent cases involving hijacking and terrorist attacks
at foreign airports, the plaintiffs, rather than the airlines, have
sought to fit within the Warsaw Convention. In a typical hijack-
ing case, the disadvantages to an injured passenger of limitations
on the carrier's liability are completely outweighed by the fact
that the carrier's liability is absolute under the Montreal Agree-
ment, which covers the great majority of United States plaintiffs.
Generally, most passengers suffer relatively minor, if any, physi-
cal injuries. Consequently, the compensable damages would be
relatively moderate and likely to fit within the limits of the Con-
vention, particularly if the Montreal Agreement, with its higher
ceiling of $75,000, is applicable.
In actions for severe injuries or death caused by terrorist
27. See A. LOWENFELD, supra note 20, at § 6.31, at VI-142; Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn,
supra note 6, at 501.
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attacks on passengers in foreign airports, a plaintiffs reasons for
attempting to fit within the Warsaw Convention are even more
compelling than in hijacking cases. Plaintiff is provided with a
financially solvent carrier as a defendant. Such defendant is
usually subject to the jurisdiction of United States courts and is
either deprived of its defenses of due care under the Montreal
Agreement, or is subject to a presumption of liability under the
Warsaw Convention. There is also the possibility of avoiding the
limits of liability if willful misconduct by the carrier18 or lack of
notice of the limits 9 is proven, or if a separate action against the
carrier's agent or servant"5 is feasible.
In an action against a carrier outside the Convention, al-
though the carrier is not subject to a liability limitation, the
passenger is required to prove the carrier's negligence without
even a presumption in his favor. This is often an impossible task
since in a typical action the terrorists have not been passengers
of the defendant airline and were not on defendant's property or
within defendant's control. If an action against the carrier is not
feasible, the injured plaintiff's only possible remedies are either
a very unpromising action against a terrorist likely to be
28. See Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 219 F. Supp. 289
(S.D.N.Y. 1963) ("willful misconduct" need not be an act intended to result in injury,
but rather one voluntarily committed despite the knowledge that harm would very likely
result from the action).
29. See Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiana S.P.A., 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), af'd,
390 U.S. 455, reh. denied, 391 U.S. 929 (1968); Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 352 F.2d
494 (9th Cir. 1965). These cases are based upon Article 3 of the Warsaw Convention which
provides that a carrier loses its limitation of liability if it "accepts a passenger without a
ticket having been delivered." This delivery requirement has been broadly construed to
require that adequate notice of the limitations of liability be provided the passenger.
30. An additional device employed to escape the Warsaw Convention liability limits
has been the bringing of a negligence action against a servant or agent of the carrier. Since
servants and agents often have contractual indemnification rights, it is usually the carrier
which bears the cost of the judgment, and the limitation of liability is thus circumvented.
Authority in this area is split, with a separate recovery outside the Convention permitted
in Pierre v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 486 (D.N.J. 1957), but denied in Chutter
v. K.L.M. Royal Dutch Airlines, 132 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), and Wanderer v.
Sabena, 1949 U.S. Av. 25 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County Feb. 10, 1949).
This issue has recently been revived in a case involving the alleged bombing of a
T.W.A. plane, where the court permitted a separate action against employees of the
carrier. Reed v. Wiser, 13 Av. Cas. 18,426 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 1976). It is likely that a
similar strategy of separate actions against officers and employees with responsibility for
security procedures will be employed in hijacking cases, should the Reed action succeed
on the merits. Although permitting separate actions against agents and employees is
technically required by the language of the Convention, which only covers carriers, it is
violative of the intention of the Warsaw Convention to limit the carrier's liability and
accomplish by indirect means a result not permitted directly under the Convention.
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judgment-proof,31 or an action against the airport operator, an
often expensive and uncertain procedure in a foreign country,
involving the application of foreign law, and lacking the advan-
tages of either absolute liability or the presumption of liability.
Therefore, except in the case of death or serious injury occur-
ring in such a manner that the liability of the carrier can be
readily proved using standard principles of law, attempts are
likely to be made in actions arising from a hijacking to fall within
the protection of the Warsaw Convention.
IX. ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE 17
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention concerns airline liabil-
ity for passenger injury and death and states in the translation
from the official French text:
The carrier shall be liable for damages sustained in the event of
the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury
suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the dam-
age so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course
of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.2
Most recent litigation in the context of hijacking and terror-
ist activities has centered upon the precise meaning of the key
words and phrases in this article. Three principal issues have
arisen: the meaning of the word "accident"; the question whether
the phrase "wounding. . . or any other bodily injury" encompas-
ses mental distress; and the precise limits entailed by the phrase
"on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of
embarking or disembarking."
A. The Meaning of the Word "Accident"
The prerequisite to the application of the Convention and the
resulting liability of a carrier under Article 17 is the occurrence
of an "accident."33 In Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., Ltd.:"
[hereinafter referred to as Husserl 1], the issue examined was
whether the hijacking of a Swiss aircraft after takeoff from Zu-
rich, followed by a forced landing in the desert near Amman,
Jordan, was an "accident" imposing liability under Article 17.
31. McClintock, Skyjacking: Its Domestic Civil and Criminal Ramification, 39 J. AIR
L. & Com. 29, 40 (1973).
32. Warsaw Convention, art. 17.
33. MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402, 1404 (1st Cir. 1971).
34. 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 485 F. 2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973).
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The court held that hijacking is an "accident" based upon its
interpretation of the Montreal Agreement and upon policy con-
siderations .35
The district court noted that the Montreal Agreement estab-
lished "absolute liability" regardless of fault or negligence,36 and
commented that the press releases by the State Department con-
cerning the Agreement did not mention the term "accident." 7
The tariff filed pursuant to the Montreal Agreement stated that
[n]othing shall be deemed to affect the rights and liabilities of
the carrier with regard to any claim brought by, on behalf of, or
in respect of any person who has willfully caused damage which
resulted in death, wounding, or other bodily injury of a passen-
ger.38
From this, the court drew the inference that it was intended that
a carrier could be held liable to injured third parties not con-
nected with the willful sabotage or hijacking.39 In examining pol-
icy considerations, the court observed that the carrier is in the
best position to take action to avoid the injury, to insure against
the occurrence, and to distribute the costs."
Husserl I has been criticized by British authority as
representing too broad a construction of the Montreal Agree-
ment."
[A] landing after a hijacking, or a precautionary landing be-
cause of a bomb warning in a place not provided for in the
contract of carriage, which does not result in an accident, does
not give rise to a valid claim under article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention. . .even though it may be alleged that e.g. nervous
shock has been suffered.42
Reliance by the Husserl I court on the wording of the Montreal
Agreement has also been criticized.13
It was incorrect for the Husserl I court to base its decision
upon the ground that the Montreal Agreement instituted a sys-
tem of absolute liability. The Montreal Agreement did not
35. 351 F. Supp. at 702.
36. Id. at 703.
37. Id. at 706.
38. Id. at 707.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 2 HALSHURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND para. 1377, n.2 (4th ed. 1973).
42. Id.
43. Id.
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change the wording of the liability of carriers under Article 17;11
it merely waived the defense of due care previously available to
the carrier under Article 22 and raised the liability ceiling to
$75,000.11 For an injury to be compensable under Article 17, the
requirement remains that it result from an accident; absolute
liability would then arise for those enumerated injuries caused by
the accident.
The district court, in relying upon the Montreal Agreement,
applied the rule that it is permissible "to look to the subsequent
action of the parties for the interpretation of the treaty in areas
clearly not anticipated at the time."46 Consequently, the attitude
of the Montreal Agreement concerning sabotage could be consid-
ered in determining whether similar acts, such as hijacking,
should fall within the coverage of the Convention. The fallacy of
this argument, however, is that the Convention is an agreement
among nations, while the Montreal Agreement is a contract be-
tween the United States and individual carriers. Since the parties
involved are totally different, it is not possible to view the phrase
"subsequent actions of the parties" as modifying the original
agreement.
However, the court was correct in holding that hijacking falls
within the word "accident." A treaty is generally interpreted by
looking to the usual meaning of its terms, "provided that they are
not expressly used in a certain technical meaning, or that another
meaning is not apparent from the context."4 Most definitions of
"accident" which mention intent stress a distinction based upon
the cause of the injury. ' The important distinction in such defini-
tions is that the injury not be the fault of the injured, rather than
whether the injury is intentionally or negligently caused by acts
of third parties. Thus, since injury resulting from a hijacking is
not a result of the intentional act of the injured passenger, it
44. 439 F.2d at 1405 n.
45. Montreal Agreement.
46. 351 F. Supp. at 707.
47. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 554, at 952 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955).
48. See, e.g., "Accident . . . [2]c. An unexpected happening causing loss or injury
which is not due to any fault or misconduct on the part of the person injured ....
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY 11 (unabr. ed. 1961) (emphasis added);
Accident. . . . In its most commonly accepted meaning or in its ordinary or
popular sense, the word may be defined as meaning a fortuitous circumstance,
event or happening, without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly
through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual and
unexpected by the person to whom it happens.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 30 (4th rev. ed. 1968) (emphasis added).
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would be an "accident" within this definition.
A further substantiation for the proposition that hijacking is
included within the term "accident" can be found by looking to
the intention of the parties49 as expressed in the debates of the
Convention." In the predecessor to Article 17 (Article 21), no
reference was made to an accident or event. Instead, liability was
defined in terms of losses occurring during the period of carriage.
The final draft of Article 21 submitted to the Warsaw delegates
stated:
The period of carriage, within the meaning of this Convention,
begins at the moment when the passengers, goods or baggage
enter the aerodrome of departure, and ends at the moment when
they leave the aerodrome of destination . . . . [A]ny loss,
damage, or delay, subject to proof to the contrary, is presumed
to have occurred during carriage .... 1
This broadly-worded article was rejected by a vote of the
delegates. They felt that liability under the Convention should
not be as broad for passengers as it is for goods and baggage. 2
49. The basic aim of treaty interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the
parties who have entered into agreement, in order to construe the document in
a manner consistent with that intent.
Maximov v. United States, 299 F.2d 565, 568 (2d Cir. 1962), afl'd, 373 U.S. 49 (1963).
50. A long-standing controversy exists concerning the use of preparatory materials.
Proponents of their use state that all words must be viewed in the context of the prepara-
tory materials to determine their intended meaning, and that to ignore the context of a
treaty provision is to seek a sterile interpretation of the words at the expense of the parties'
intention. See Vienna Conference, 1st Session, Official Records of Meetings 167-68, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 39/11 (1969) (comments of United States Delegate McDougal).
Others oppose the liberal use of preparatory materials on the grounds that prelimi-
nary discussions are not necessarily the final views of the parties; that it is unfair to later
acceding parties to the treaty to incorporate preliminary discussions; and that the use of
such materials is a device employed by parties seeking to avoid the plain meaning of a
treaty. Id. at 169-84 (especially the comments of the delegates from Uruguay, id. at 169-
70, Poland, id. at 173-74, the U.S.S.R., id. at 175, France, id. at 175-76, and the United
Kingdom, id. at 177-78).
The use of preparatory material has been explicitly approved by the Supreme Court
and is often used in treaty construction.
In ascertaining the meaning of a treaty we may look beyond its written words
to the negotiations and diplomatic correspondence of the contracting parties
relating to the subject matter, and to their own practical construction of it.
Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 294 (1933). Accord, Arizona v. California, 292 U.S.
341, 359-60 (1934).
51. D. GOEDHuIs, NATIONAL AIR LEGISLATION AND THE WARSAW CONVENTION 188 (1937);
C.I.T.E.J.A. MINUTES 42, 45 (3d Sess. 1928) (original French text).
52. SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AERONAUTICAL LAW OCT. 4-12, 1929
WARSAW MINUTES 67-83 (R. Homer & D. Legrez transl. 1975) [hereinafter cited as WARSAW
MINUTESI.
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Article 21 was resubmitted to the drafting committee and re-
placed by two articles: Article 17, covering passenger liability and
limiting it to "accidents"; \and Article 18, covering goods and
baggage, havipg a wider scope, and using the word "occurrence"
rather than "accident." This draft was accepted without com-
ment. 3
The debate concerning the original Article 21 reflects the
considerations which led the drafting committee to distinguish
between passengers and baggage. A French delegate stated that
the different treatment of passengers and goods was necessary
because passengers have "independence," while baggage is to-
tally under the control of the carrier.-" Other delegates expressed
concern that the passenger, through volitional acts, could place
himself in a situation totally unconnected to the contract of car-
riage and beyond the carrier's control during stopovers, forced
landings, or within the terminal building."'
The delegates' major concern was that passengers could per-
form acts which would lead to their injury in areas outside the
carrier's control; whether the wrongdoer's act was intentional or
negligent was of secondary importance. Since goods and baggage
are inanimate objects, no similar concern existed regarding cau-
sation and consequently "occurrence" rather than "accident"
was considered the appropriate term. The belief was that the
carrier should not accept a presumption of liability when the
passenger had been injured by a third party in a geographical
area not within the carrier's control. There was no intention that
such an injury in an area within the carrier's control should not
be considered an "accident" and fall within the Convention.
The French delegate's view that the "independence" of pas-
sengers constitutes the basis of the distinction between passen-
gers and baggage5" is consistent with the idea that the central
concept in the term "accident" is that the injury must not be the
result of an intentional act of the injured person. Thus, a hijack-
ing could be considered an "accident" within this definition,
since it is a sudden and unexpected event that is not intentionally
caused by the injured passenger. Later cases involving hijacking
53. WARSAW MINUTES 206.
54. Id. at 73.
55. Id. See comments of the British delegate, id. at 68; the Italian delegate, id. at
70; the Hungarian delegate, id. at 72; the Soviet delegate, id. at 72; the French delegate
Mr. Vivent, id. at 75; and the French delegate Mr. Ripert, id. at 80.
56. WARSAW MINuTEs 67, 72-73.
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and terrorism appear to support this concept since defendant
airlines have either stipulated that hijacking is an accident, or
failed to raise this issue. 7
B. Mental Distress
Much recent litigation resulting from hijacking has focused
upon whether the phrase "wounding. . .or other bodily injury" 8
encompasses mental distress. This issue is particularly important
in hijacking cases because often physical injuries are either very
minor or nonexistent. Therefore, the court is faced with the prob-
lem of compensation of mental distress within the boundaries of
Article 17 of the Convention.
Differing judicial opinions have been reached. It has been
stated that mental distress not resulting from impact is not com-
pensable (Judge Stevens' dissent in Rosman v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc.59); it is compensable only when a direct result of
bodily injury (Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.'"); it is com-
pensable if it is either caused by or is the result of physical injury
(Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.'); it is compensable only
if an appropriate cause of action exists under the substantive law
of the jurisdiction (Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., Ltd.12
[hereinafter referred to as Husserl II]); and that it is always
compensable (Krystal v. British Overseas Airways Corp.").
The Rosman, Burnett, and Husserl II cases evolved from the
same event. A Swiss Air and a T.W.A. aircraft were hijacked by
members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine,
who forced the pilots to land on a desert airstrip outside Amman,
Jordan. The passengers and crew were held captive for a week on
board the aircraft. The plaintiffs in these cases asserted claims
of various physical injuries such as rashes and swollen feet, and
also complained of mental distress due to anxiety and physical
57. In Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
- U.S. -, 97 S. Ct. 246 (1976), and Krystal v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 403
F. Supp. 1322, 1323 (C.D. Cal. 1975), both involving hijacking, the courts stated that
defendant airlines did not dispute that the hijackings were "accidents" within the mean-
ing of Article 17. In In re Tel Aviv, 405 F. Supp. 154, 155 (D.P.R. 1975), defendant Air
France conceded that the terrorist attack within the airport was an "accident."
58. Warsaw Convention, art. 17.
59. 34 N.Y.2d 385, 400, 314 N.E.2d 848, 857, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97, 110 (1974).
60. 368 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.M. 1973).
61. 34 N.Y.2d 385, 314 N.E.2d 848, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974).
62. 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
63. 403 F. Supp. 1322 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
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suffering after a week's exposure to extremes in temperature, food
and water deprivation, and inadequate sanitation facilities."4
In Burnett the district court held that only mental distress
resulting from physical injury is compensable. 5 The court, stat-
ing that the French legal meaning of the terms used in the War-
saw Convention is controlling,"6 determined that "blessure"
(translated as "wounding") may not encompass mental injuries
since it is modified by the phrase "ou de tout autre lesion
corporelle" (translated as "or any other bodily injury"). In addi-
tion, the court found that French law clearly distinguishes be-
tween bodily injury ("lesion corporelle") and mental injury ("16-
sion mentale") .67
Thus neither phrase could encompass mental distress with-
out a basis of physical injury." In addition, the court cited the
Berne Convention on International Rail Transport where a provi-
sion similar to that of Article 17 was interpreted to permit such
a recovery only after the phrase "ou mentale" was added."
The Rosman court also concluded that mental distress alone
is not compensable under the Warsaw Convention, basing its
conclusion on the ordinary meaning of the words "bodily injury,"
but allowed recovery for the mental suffering which resulted from
a bodily injury." Such bodily injury could be caused by physical
impact, physical circumstances, or psychic trauma.7' Thus, men-
tal distress is compensable according to the court's view if it
either is the result of bodily injury or results in physical
manifestations.
Judge Stevens stated in his Rosman dissent that actual phys-
ical impact is necessary under Article 17 and that mental injury
was not intended to be encompassed within the Convention as a
64. 368 F. Supp. at 1158.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1155. See Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 330 (5th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968). In Rosman, the New York Court of Appeals
reached a similar result, although it followed a different analysis. The court used the
ordinary meaning of the English words translated from the original French text of the
Warsaw Convention. It found no need to delve into the French language, French law, or
the legislative history of the Convention. 34 N.Y.2d at 393-95, 314 N.E.2d at 852-54, 358
N.Y.S.2d at 104-06. See 2 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 189, 199-200 (1975); 13 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 452, 454-58 (1974); see generally J.W. SUNDBERG, AIR CHARTER 242-46
(1961).
67. 368 F. Supp. at 1156.
68. Id. at 1158.
69. Id. at 1157-58.
70. 34 N.Y.2d at 399-400, 314 N.E.2d at 857, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 109-10.
71. Id. at 399, 314 N.E.2d at 856, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
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separate cause of action; recovery for mental distress is a recent
development in United States law and was not within the con-
templation of the parties to a convention aimed at limiting ,car-
riers' liability in a risky new enterprise."
The court in Husserl II felt that the list of includible injuries
in the Warsaw Convention was not meant to be exhaustive and
that therefore this "vacuum" should be filled by a -liberal inter-
pretation;73 the list should be "enumerated expansively to com-
prehend as many types of injury as possible for which there is
normally legal redress."7 This contention is difficult to support.
First, no vacuum exists since the ordinary meaning of the words
"wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury" in both the
French and English contexts precludes a finding that mental in-
jury was intended. The Husserl II court's interpretation is con-
trary to the principle that the primary purpose of treaty interpre-
tation is to effect the intention of the parties.75 The primary pur-
poses of the Convention were to limit the liability of carriers and
to promote uniformity.78 Both purposes are best served by limit-
ing Article 17 liability to its express terms rather than by expand-
ing compensation to limits beyond the contemplation of the par-
ties.
The Husserl II court stated that mental distress without
physical injury was compensable if such a cause of action would
be permissible under the "otherwise applicable substantive
law."" A broad view of Article 17 is also necessitated in the
court's view by the fact that the Warsaw Convention has been
interpreted as not creating a cause of action." While this is the
majority view in the United States,79 the Convention does set
limits under which the action may be brought"0 and among these
limitations is the Article 17 requirement that liability result from
death, wounding, or other bodily injuries. Article 24 states that
72. Id. at 403-04, 314 N.E.2d at 859, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 112.
73. 388 F. Supp. at 1250.
74. Id. at 1247.
75. See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 47.
76. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsobn, supra note 6.
77. 388 F. Supp. at 1253.
78. Id. at 1251-52.
79. See, e.g., Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 111 F. Supp. 393, 401
(S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
820 (1954); Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 907 (1957). But see C.N. SHAWCROSS & K.M. BEAuMNTo, AiR LAW § 365, at 347
(1951).
80. 388 F. Supp. at 1252.
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any actions covered by Article 17 must be brought subject to the
Convention's conditions and limitations. As the New York Court
of Appeals in Rosman stated:
[E]ven if plaintiff's actions for damages depended upon some
other subsisting right of action . . . it does not follow that New
York or any other jurisdiction can redefine the scope or sub-
stance of the carrier's liability as it is provided in the Conven-
tion."'
This expansive view of mental distress of Husserl Ii was fol-
lowed in Krystal, a case involving the hijacking of a B.O.A.C.
aircraft on a flight from Bombay to London. The fact pattern
differs from the previous hijacking cases in that one of the two
plaintiffs alleged solely mental distress.12 The court, relying upon
a broad interpretation of Article 17, allowed recovery for mental
distress without physical injury. The court considered signifi-
cant the fact that the notice given by airlines to passengers used
the phrase "personal injury" rather than "physical injury. '84
There is no generally accepted view by commentators on the
subject of recovery for mental distress. Coquoz 5 admits the word-
ing is ambiguous and that a revision of the Article would be
helpful. 6 Riese,17 the foremost proponent of the inclusion of men-
tal distress in Article 17, bases his conclusion upon strained logic.
Rather than using the argument that "blessure" encompasses
any wounding, mental or physical, Riese suggests that "blessure"
means physical wounding and that "lesions corporelle" would be
redundant if it were interpreted to signify only physical injury.
Riese makes what he admits is a "free translation" of the French
"lesion corporelle" to mean "Gesundheitsbeschtdigung" (trans-
lated "injuries to the health"'), and states that it encompasses
psychic injury, among other things.8 Similarly, the phrase "inju-
ries to the health" replaces the words "lesion corporelle" in the
translations incorporating Article 17 into the municipal law of
81. 34 N.Y.2d at 398, 314 N.E.2d at 856, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 108.
82. 403 F. Supp. at 1322-23.
83. Id. at 1324.
84. Id. at 1323.
85. R. CoQuoz, LE DROIT PRIV9 INTERNATIONAL MRIEN 122 (1938).
86. Id.
87. O. RIESE, LUFTRECHT 442-43 (1949); see also 0. PbEsE & J. LACOUR, PRECIS DE DROIT
ARIEN 264 (1951).
88. 0. RIESE, LuFrRECHT 442-43 (1949).
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Germany (in 1943)89 and Norway (in 1960).10
Although Riese's narrow view of "blessure" as limited to a
physical wounding is justified by the text of Article 17, his conclu-
sion that this necessarily makes "lesion corporelle" redundant
and that therefore it must mean something other than physical
injury, is incorrect.' One can read Article 17 in its present form
without concluding it is redundant. By the term "wounding"
("blessure") the article probably refers to injuries which are nor-
mally feared in a new and dangerous form of transportation, such
as those resulting from airplane crashes, forced landings, falls,
turbulence, propeller mishaps, and other accidents involving
bodily contact. Thus, "toute autre l6sion corporelle"92 would refer
to such bodily injuries as food or chemical poisoning, ear injuries
from changes in atmospheric pressure, and other internal injuries
resulting from external events. The soundest view, therefore, ap-
pears to be that mental distress without physical injury or physi-
cal manifestations is not compensable, as was held in Rosman.
C. On Board, Embarking, and Disembarking
The third area of recent litigation involving Article 17 con-
cerns the scope of the phrase "on board the aircraft or in the
course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking."
On Board
In Herman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.," the defendant
airline alleged that the Warsaw Convention did not apply to inju-
ries sustained by passengers during the week plaintiffs were held
captive by hijackers, since the flight had terminated and defen-
dant's "aircraft was being used without its consent as a detention
camp."94 Reversing on other grounds, the Appellate Division
agreed with the Supreme Court's rejection of defendant's argu-
ment, stating that plaintiffs were on board the aircraft during
89. D. LURLEAU, LA RESPONSABILITt DE TRANSPORTEUR AgRIEN 214 (1961) (doctoral
thesis).
90. La Jurisprudence des Pays Scandinaves sur la Convention de Varsovie, 29 Revue
Francaise de Droit A6rien 21, 22 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Rev. Fr. Dr. Arien].
91. A contention similar to that made by Riese was rejected by the district court in
Husserl H. 388 F. Supp. at 1250.
92. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
93. 69 Misc. 2d 642, 330 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd, 40 App. Div. 2d 850, 337
N.Y.S.2d 827 (2d Dep't 1972), rev'd, 34 N.Y.2d 385, 314 N.E.2d 848, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97
(1974) (consolidated on appeal with Rosman).
94. 69 Misc. 2d at 645, 330 N.Y.S. 2d at 832.
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the entire time and thus fulfilled the geographic requirements
of Article 17.11
In Husserl II, the district court took an expansive view of the
phrase "on board the aircraft" and interpreted it to signify the
entire time between embarkation and disembarkation. Plain-
tiffs were permitted to recover for the mental distress suffered in
an Amman hotel, after their return to Zurich, the original depar-
ture point. The court stated that this interpretation was consis-
tent with the purposes of the Convention and that the Warsaw
drafters had made such an assumption." However, this construc-
tion of the phrase "on board the aircraft" is directly contrary to
that intended by the drafters of the Convention. As previously
stated,98 an expansive draft article placing liability upon the car-
rier for losses and injury during the entire period of carriage,
defined as encompassing the time of entry into the airport until
leaving the airport upon arrival, was thoroughly discussed and
6xplicitly rejected by a vote of the delegates.9
During the discussion preceding the vote, two amendments
were offerbd specifically covering the situation of a forced land-
ing. The British proposal suggested terminating carrier liability
for passenger injuries after a forced landing "when the
[passenger] leaves the immediate proximity of the landing," '
while the Hungarian proposal would limit liability in such a situ-
ation to the period prior to the passenger's disembarkation of the
aircraft.'0 ' The two amendments were not voted upon since the
preliminary vote rejected the original broadly-worded article
which the amendments were meant to modify.' 2 The matter was
referred to the drafting committee which submitted a new draft
retaining the broad language with respect to baggage and goods
and incorporating narrower geographical limitations with respect
to passengers.' 3
Thus a contention that the drafters "assumed" that "on
board the aircraft" would encompass the entire period from the
95. 40 App. Div. 2d 853, 337 N.Y.S. 2d at 832. This question was not presented to
the Court of Appeals.
96. 388 F. Supp. at 1247.
97. Id. at 1248.
98. See text accompanying notes 50-55 supra.
99. WARSAW MINUTES 67-83.
100. Id. at 68.
101. Id. at 71-72.
102. Id. at 83.
103. Id. at 166.
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original embarkation to disembarkation at a scheduled arrival
point is totally contrary to the ordinary meaning of the words "on
board the aircraft" and also to the stated purpose of the delegates
in explicitly rejecting such a broad interpretation. Nor is the
Husserl II court's contention well founded that such an interpre-
tation is necessitated by "the immense difficulty in determining
proximate causation between accident and injury and to allocate
between on board and off."' 4 Courts are routinely called upon to
make such distinctions, and should not avoid them by distorting
the clear meaning of an international convention.
Embarking
Two recent decisions, Evangelinos, v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc.,'15 and Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,' 6 have discussed
the scope of the operations of embarking in the context of a terror-
ist attack in the waiting room of the Athens airport. ?Plaintiffs
were passengers on a departing T.W.A. flight. In both Day' 7 and
Evangelinos'8 plaintiffs had checked in at the ticket counter,
cleared Greek government formalities, proceeded to the transit
lounge where they were given boarding passes by T.W.A. employ-
ees, and were standing in line to be searched by Greek police
when the attack occurred.
The district court in Day held that the operations of embar-
kation consisted of at least eleven steps, from the initial present-
ing of the passenger ticket to walking on board the aircraft. The
passengers had already completed five of these steps at the time
of the incident,' 9 and therefore the Warsaw Convention was
deemed applicable. This decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, which stated that a test based
upon geographical limitations was unnecessarily rigid and that
the Convention should be interpreted flexibly to conform to the
procedures and risks inherent in present-day aviation."'
In Evangelinos, the district court held that
104. 388 F. Supp. at 1247.
105. 396 F. Supp. 95 (W.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 14 Av. Cas. 17,101 (3d
Cir. May 4, 1976).
106. 393 F. Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 528 F.2d 31 (2nd Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 97
S. Ct. 246 (1976).
107. 528 F.2d at 32.
108. 396 F. Supp. at 97.
109. 393 F. Supp. at 221, 223.
110. 528 F.2d at 38.
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[w]hen the passengers were waiting in line to proceed to the
last gate of the terminal, they were not within the "operations
of embarkation" .....,,
According to the court, the term "operations of embarkation" was
a geographical designation. 1 2 In support of this position the court
cited a discussion at the Fifth International Conference of Air
Navigation at The Hague" 3 in 1930 in which the only controversy
concerning the definition was whether the operations of
embarkation begin when the passenger leaves the airport ter-
minal for the aircraft or when he is in the actual process of step-
ping into the aircraft."' This holding was reversed on appeal by
the Third Circuit in an opinion closely following the reasoning by
the district court and the Second Circuit in Day.
In support of the Day point of view were the deliberations of
the Guatemala Conference of 1971. Several delegates were con-
cerned that the draft language, which set the same spatial limita-
tion as the original Article 17, would impose liability upon the
carriers for injuries occurring within the terminal."' However, the
delegates voted to accept the draft as written."'
The Day rationale, however, contains logical inconsistencies,
as was recognized by Judge Seitz in his cogent dissent in
Evangelinos."'7 The Second Circuit in Day stated that such a
finding was consistent with the original purpose of the Warsaw
Convention, since uniformity would be served by bringing all
such actions under the Warsaw umbrella rather than leaving
them to local law."8 This view may be refuted by the fact that
by voting against the original broad article, the delegates dis-
tinctly demonstrated that they did not wish to have all possible
situations encompassed within the Warsaw system for the sake
111. 396 F. Supp. at 103.
112. The Day court's expansive interpretation is a realization of the concern of some
delegates to the Guatemala Convention that the draft language (which contained the
same spatial limitation as Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention) would impose liability
upon the carriers for injuries within the terminal. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AIR LAW,
GUATEMALA CITY, FEB.-MAR. 1971, MINUTES 31-45, I.C.A.O. Doc. 9040-LC/167.1 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as GUATEMALA MINUTES].
113. 2 GOUVERNEMENT NgERLANDAIS, L'AtIROCLUB ROYAL DES PAYS-BAS, CINQUItME
CONOR9ZS INTERNATIONAL DE LA NAVIGATION AgRIENNE, LA HAYE 1930, COMTE-RENDU 1173
(1931).
114. 396 F. Supp. at 101.
115. GUATEMALA MINUTES 31-45.
116. Id.
117. 14 Av. Cas. at 17,104.
118. 528 F.2d at 38.
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of uniformity. The Convention was based upon a fault orientation
and the concern expressed by numerous delegates about liability
in situations totally unrelated to the fault of the carrier, events
outside its control, and non-aviation-oriented events (such as
injuries during stopovers, or within airport facilities)" 9 amply
demonstrates that not all events were intended to be included in
the Convention. While the Day decisions considered such a geo-
graphical interpretation of the phrase in question to be exces-
sively rigid, both the preliminary discussions and the language of
the Article itself demonstrate that a geographical distinction was
indeed intended.1 20
The Day courts implied that the Convention must be suffi-
ciently flexible to encompass modern departure procedures at
large international terminals, such as the Athens facility. How-
ever, the reality of such procedures in fact suggests a contrary
conclusion. After the initial contact with the carrier's employees
at the check-in counter (which is usually required to occur a
minimum of 90 minutes before departure), the passenger is told
to proceed to passport and currency controls, which are required
by and totally controlled by local governments. Upon leaving
such an area, the modern traveler often finds himself in an inter-
national bazaar composed of duty-free shops of every variety,
restaurants, bars, banks, and other facilities. This transit area,
as well as the airport building itself, is usually owned and con-
trolled by an independent airport authority or a local govern-
ment. The facilities used directly by the carriers are often leased,
and the carriers' landing rights controlled by international treat-
ies and local governmental regulations.'21
The transit lounges are often, as at the Athens airport, com-
munal areas where passengers awaiting embarkation on many
different airlines mingle. In the Greek airport, the passengers
were given their seat assignments in the transit lounge at a long
counter shared by the representatives of T.W.A. and all the other
airlines serving the airport.2 2 This was the only personal contact
with the carriers until after the security search. Therefore, at
best, the carriers maintain occasional contacts with the passen-
119. WARSAW MINUTES 68-83. See especially comments of the British delegate, id. at
68; the French delegates, id. at 75; and the Soviet delegate, id. at 72.
120. Id.
121. See generally B. CHENG, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 381-411
(1962).
122. 396 F. Supp. at 97.
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gers; they do not maintain control over them. Nor can the carrier
exert any control over access to the waiting room. This is deter-
mind by government controls and airport operators.
The "flexible" approach offered by the Day court is contrary
to the views expressed by many delegates to the Convention. The
Soviet delegate stated that it is not logical for carriers to be held
liable for injuries occurring in a terminal restaurant.'23 A French
delegate expressed the view that a distinct separation exists be-
tween the functions of the airport operators and that of the car-
riers, and that the airport operators should be held liable for
injuries occurring within the terminal building.124 By their failure
to define the term, the delegates left the precise determination of
the point of embarkation to the courts. However, the judiciary
should be bound by the clear intention of the parties as expressed
in both preliminary and later statements by the delegates.
The district court in Day contended that although a terrorist
attack is not an event within the contemplation of the parties, it
is a risk inherent in modern aviation and therefore should be
subject to the liability limits of the Convention.' 2 Terrorist at-
tacks have unfortunately focused upon national symbols in inter-
national contexts, such as a country's national airline and its
passengers, diplomats, and athletic teams. International aviation
has often been used as a target or a means of escape, but such a
risk is one that often occurs in the context of aviation, not one
that is necessarily inherent in aviation itself.'26
Disembarking
The issues involved in defining the operations of
disembarkation are basically the same as those arising with re-
spect to embarkation, although the district court in Day at-
tempted to make a distinction upon the basis that there are "few
activities if any which the carrier requires the passenger to per-
123. WARSAW MINUTES 72.
124. Id. at 75.
125. 393 F. Supp. at 222.
126. Judge Seitz, in his Evangelinos dissent, stated:
[I]n my view, a terrorist attack inside an airport is no more likely than
the bombing of a restaurant, bank, or other public place. Accordingly, I believe
that the majority's conclusion that plaintiffs were injured as a result of a risk
inherent in modem air travel is unwarranted. The particular hazards of terror-
ism which are unique to air navigation are simply not risks to which passengers
in plaintiffs' proximity were exposed.
14 Av. Cas. at 17,104-05.
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form at all, or in any specific sequence."'' 1 The Evangelinos dis-
trict court correctly rejected this view, stating that the formalities
of arrival are comparable to those of departure.2 8
In In re Tel Aviv, 129. involving a terrorist attack in the bag-
gage claim areas of the Tel Aviv airport, the district court held
that the attack was outside the area of disembarkation, citing
MacDonald v. Air Canada'30 as controlling. 3' There, the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit stated that a fall occurring in a
baggage claim area is not covered by the Warsaw Convention
since the passenger "has reached a safe point inside of the
terminal .... ,,132 Similar results were reached in Felismina v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc.,'33 in which a passenger injured on an
escalator in the terminal leading to the customs area and baggage
claim was held to be "well beyond the point of disembarka-
tion,"' 34 and Klein v. K.L.M. Royal Dutch Airlines,131 in which a
passenger had already disembarked when injured on a conveyor
belt in the baggage claim area.
Commentators and Foreign Courts
Commentators and foreign courts have generally made no
distinction between embarkation and disembarkation with re-
spect to the geographical area involved. A large majority have
endorsed the view that the period spent in an airport terminal is
not included in the definition of "in the course of any of the
operations of embarking and disembarking." The generally ac-
cepted view is that the carrier's liability commences when the
passenger leaves the building to walk to the plane (or if there is
no building, when he steps onto the tarmac at the airport apron)
and ceases at a similar point in the airport upon arrival.3 '
Chauveau 137 and Guldimann 38 stress the risks of aviation in
127. 393 F. Supp. at 223.
128. 396 F. Supp. at 102.
129. 405 F. Supp. 154 (D.P.R. 1975).
130. 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1971).
131. 405 F. Supp. at 156.
132. 439 F.2d at 1405.
133. 13 Av. Cas. 17,145 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 1974).
134. Id.
135. 46 App. Div. 2d 679, 360 N.Y.S. 2d 60 (2d Dep't 1974).
136. H. DRION, LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW §§ 72-76, at 82-
87 (1954); GOEDHUIS, supra note 51, at 192-97; M. LEMOINE, TRAITE DE DROIT ARIEN; 539-
40 (1947); N. MATEESCO MATTA, TRAIT9 DE DROIT MRIEN-MRONAUTIQUE 405 (2d ed. 1964);
M. POURCELET, TRANSPORT AMRIEN INTERNATIONAL ET RESPONSIBILITt 40-44 (1964).
137. P. CHAUVEAU, DROIT AgRIEN § 325, at 174 (1951).
138. W. GULDIMANN, INTERNATIONALES LUFTFRANSPORTRECHT 100 n.4 (1965).
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reaching this conclusion. In the context of embarkation, Sulli-
van'39 states:
Most large airports are managed so that passengers for a partic-
ular plane are kept behind a gate until the ship is in position
and ready to be loaded. The gate is then opened and the passen-
gers walk to the plane. The very fact that a gate is used indicates
that particular hazards exist ahead. It is at that point that the
passenger passes from the custody of the waiting-room operator,
to the custody of the person or corporation who is to perform the
contract of carriage. This would seem then the logical place to
draw the line.'4
The only major controversy has not been whether the above defi-
nition is too restrictive, as the Day court would feel, but whether
it is too broad. It is generally characterized as the "liberal view"
as compared with the view incorporated into the municipal law
of Germany,'4 ' Norway,'42 and Sweden 3 that only the actual en-
tering and leaving of the aircraft are included. An even more
restrictive view is held in the Soviet Union: liability is not consid-
ered to commence until take-off and terminates upon landing.' 44
British authority has approved the result in MacDonald, i.e.,
that although an arriving passenger retains that status in the
terminal building, the Warsaw Convention does not apply after
the passenger attains a point of safety within the terminal. 45 The
view that there are definite spatial limitations upon the scope of
Article 17 is also expressed in European judicial opinions. French
decisions are particularly relevant since, as previously noted,
French is the official language of the Convention. Mach6 v. Cie
Air France'41 involved a passenger who was injured as he followed
139. Sullivan, The Codification of Air Carrier Liability by International Conven-
tion, 7 J. AIR L. & COMi. 1 (1936).
140. Id. at 21.
141. W. GULDIMANN, supra note 138, at 101-02.
142. La Jurisprudence des Pays Scandinaves sur la Convention de Varsovie, supra
note 90, at 122.
143. Id.
144. 0. LURLEAU, supra note 89, at 216.
145. 2 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 41, at para. 1377.
146. Mach6 v. Cie Air France, [1968] D.S. Jur. 515, 21 Rev. Fr. Dr. Afrien 343 (Cour
d' Appel, Rouen), aff 'd, Judgment of June 3, 1970, [1971] D.S. Jur. 373, [1970] 24 Rev.
Fr. Dr. Afrien 311.
For a discussion of this complicated ten-year litigation involving decisions by the
Cour d'Appel de Rouen in 1967, the Cour d'Appel de Paris in 1963, and the Tribunal de
Grand Instance de la Seine in 1961, as well as decisions by the Cour de Cassation in 1966
and 1970, see Cas, La Responsibilit6 du TransporteurA~rien Pour Dommages Causes aux
Passagers au Cours d'Operations Aeroportuaires, 31 Revue G~n~rale de I'Air et de l'Espace
117 (1968); 29 Revue Generale del 1'Air et de l'Espace 32, 35 (1966) (comments of E.
Pontavice).
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two airline employees from the airplane to the terminal. The
passenger fell into a drain in the ground outside a customs yard
while detouring around a construction site. The highest court in
France, in a ruling even more restrictive than the view favored by
commentators, stated that since the passenger had left the traffic
apron and was thus some distance from the dangers of aviation,
disembarking had ceased and the Warsaw Convention did not
apply.4 7
In the recent case of Forsius v. Cie Air France,' another
French court held that a passenger who fell on a slippery floor in
an airport corridor near the customs area was not in the course
of disembarking as required by Article 17. A third French case,
Cie Air France v. Nicoli,14 5 held that a passenger injured by a
motorized luggage cart while walking to the airplane from the
terminal was covered by the provisions of the Warsaw Conven-
tion. In a fourth French case, Fratani-Bassaler v. Air France,10
the Warsaw Convention was found to apply to a fall by a passen-
ger on steps leading down to the airplane (although the carrier
was permitted to use defenses available under the Hague Proto-
col).
Courts in the Netherlands' 51 and Germany'52 in cases involv-
ing embarkation have reached conclusions consistent with the
French holdings.'53 These decisions are in accord with the major-
ity of commentators who feel that liability begins after a passen-
ger passes through the final gate and heads toward the airplane,
and ceases upon entry into the terminal building.
CONCLUSION
The recent history of Article 17 has been one of attempted
147. Judgment of June 3, 1970, [1971] D.S. Jur. at 373, [1970] 24 Rev. Fr. Dr.
A~rien at 314.
148. Judgment of Feb. 19, 1973, [1973] 27 Rev. Fr. Dr. A6rien 216 (Tribunal de
Grande Instance de Paris, 4e Ch. Ire Sect.).
149. Judgment of Apr. 2, 1971 (Cour d'Appel, Paris), [1971] 25 Rev. Fr. Dr. A6rien
1973.
150. Judgment of Nov. 14, 1967 (Cour d'Appel, Aix-en-Provence), [19681 22 Rev. Fr.
Dr. A~rien 201.
151. Richardson v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Mij. (Tribunal D'Arondissement de
Haarlem, 4-V-1971), Revue de Droit Uniform 365 (Neth. 1975) (Warsaw Convention does
not apply to an accident in the baggage claim area although the passenger was voluntarily
returning to the aircraft).
152. Judgment of Mar. 11, 1961, 11 Zeitschrift ffR Luftrecht und Weltraum-
rechtsfragen 78 (Kammergericht I.O.U. 61.60, 1962) (passenger injured on stairs after
leaving the waiting room to board an airplane is within Article 17).
153. However, an Austrian case lends support to the viewpoint expressed in Day.
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judicial expansion of its scope. With respect to the type of event
resulting in liability, the intentional acts of third parties would
now appear to be included within the meaning of the term "acci-
dent." The nature of the resulting injuries that are compensable
have been expanded to include recovery for mental distress even
without physical injury.. The spatial limitations have been en-
larged by attempts to change the geographical criterion "on board
the aircraft" into one of time frame, and to expand the spatial
connotations of "all the operations of embarking and disembark-
ing" by use of the criteria of control and purpose.
Many decisions seem to have been unduly based upon policy
considerations rather than upon the intent of the parties to the
Warsaw Convention. Such decisions not only are contrary to ac-
cepted basic principles of treaty interpretation, but may result in
substantial inequities when applied in differing circumstances.
The terms of the Convention should not be stretched beyond both
the ordinary meaning of the words comprising the text of the
treaty, and the intention of the parties as reflected in preliminary
discussions and later statements by the delegates. A more desira-
ble goal would be that favored by Judge Stevens in his Rosman
dissent'54-to establish a method of compensation for victims of
hijacking and terrorism under the Convention or the Montreal
Agreement similar to new systems in areas of the United States
compensating victims of crime.155
This objective could be accomplished through a multilateral
agreement reached under the auspices of the United Nations, or
possibly through an amendment to the present Warsaw system.
The mechanics established by the Guatemala Protocol for sup-
plemental compensation above the $100,000 limit by individual
nations on a voluntary basis could be expanded to an obligatory
system on a multilateral basis.
Upon the implementation of such a system of compensation,
current judicial attempts to expand the boundaries of the Con-
vention would be rendered unnecessary. Liability would not be
Liability was held to commence when the flight is called rather than when the passengers
pass through the gate. Judgment of Apr. 27, 1972, [1972] OGH 54.
154. 34 N.Y. 2d at 404, 314 N.E. 2d at 852, 358 N.Y.S. 2d at 112.
155. See generally Floyd, Victim Compensation Plans, 55 A.B.A.J. 159 (1969); Lam-
born, The Methods of Governmental Compensation of Victims of Crime, 1971 U. ILL.
L. FORUM 655; Symposium: Governmental Compensation for Victims of Violence, 43 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1 (1970).
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imposed upon the airlines for injuries caused by the actions of
third parties in areas beyond the carrier's control, and the injured
passenger would be guaranteed full and adequate compensation
without the necessity of expensive and time-consuming litigation.
Carol Lynne Tomeny
